Discussions with Crispin on the Prolegomena: Vol. 2
The second of my ongoing series of discussions with Crispin Sartwell on my Prolegomena for a Pluralist Metaphysics.
Prolegomena for a Pluralist Metaphysics: Actions, Reasons, Causes … and Ends
by Daniel A. Kaufman ____ I’ve been saying that I’d like a return to philosophical “normalcy,” meaning that I’d like us to stop indulging what I’ve been calling, alternatively, “crazy” and “desperate” philosophical positions: Panpsychism; Hard Determinism; Eliminative Materialism and “Illusionism”; Platonism; Mind/Body Dualism; and so on. I’m running an ongoing series of conversations with Crispin Sartwell alongside these prolegomena, […]
Prolegomena for a Pluralist Metaphysics: Initial Impressions
by Daniel A. Kaufman ___ A number of recent – and not so recent – essays and shorter pieces, plus several dialogues with Massimo Pigliucci and discussions on Twitter have begun to converge in my mind around several points, all of which suggest (a) a fundamentally pluralist metaphysics and (b) a central role for Wilfrid Sellars’ landmark paper “Philosophy and […]
Representations, Reasons, and Actions
by Daniel A. Kaufman ___ More and more it seems to me that the way in which philosophy has gone the most wrong is in trying to assimilate human action with the motions of bodies, as understood in the natural sciences. This effort has made a mess of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of action, as well as ethics, […]
Why The Free Will Problem Isn’t One
by Daniel A. Kaufman First of all, the “Free Will Problem” is a stupid name. I mean, do I have to think there is such a thing as a “will” in order to believe in Free Will? Or “freedom,” beyond that of being able to go to the mall, if I want to or not, if don’t? Am I supposed […]
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