Discussions with Crispin on the Prolegomena: Vol. 2
The second of my ongoing series of discussions with Crispin Sartwell on my Prolegomena for a Pluralist Metaphysics.
Prolegomena for a Pluralist Metaphysics: People
by Daniel A. Kaufman ___ I shouldn’t need to tell anyone that there are people. You’re a person, as am I. There likely are others in your house. Certainly, there are more down on the street. I understand from a not entirely reliable authority that Hell consists of them. Clearly, uncontroversially, obviously, people exist. They aren’t illusions. They aren’t like […]
Prolegomena for a Pluralist Metaphysics: Actions, Reasons, Causes … and Ends
by Daniel A. Kaufman ____ I’ve been saying that I’d like a return to philosophical “normalcy,” meaning that I’d like us to stop indulging what I’ve been calling, alternatively, “crazy” and “desperate” philosophical positions: Panpsychism; Hard Determinism; Eliminative Materialism and “Illusionism”; Platonism; Mind/Body Dualism; and so on. I’m running an ongoing series of conversations with Crispin Sartwell alongside these prolegomena, […]
Discussions with Crispin on the Prolegomena: Vol. 1
by Daniel A. Kaufman ____ The first of what will be several dialogues with Crispin Sartwell (Dickinson College) on my Prolegomena for a Pluralist Metaphysics.
Prolegomena for a Pluralist Metaphysics: Initial Impressions
by Daniel A. Kaufman ___ A number of recent – and not so recent – essays and shorter pieces, plus several dialogues with Massimo Pigliucci and discussions on Twitter have begun to converge in my mind around several points, all of which suggest (a) a fundamentally pluralist metaphysics and (b) a central role for Wilfrid Sellars’ landmark paper “Philosophy and […]
Course Notes – Paul Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes”
by Daniel A. Kaufman https://ruccs.rutgers.edu/images/personal-zenon-pylyshyn/class-info/FP2012_readings/Churchland_EliminativeMaterialsm.pdf In the philosophy of mind, apart from sensations, with their perplexing “qualia,” intentional states, the so-called “propositional attitudes,” have proven materialism’s biggest headache. Materialism’s greatest hope, functionalism – and particularly its computational variety – ran into trouble with the propositional attitudes by way of the Chinese (or at least, one of their Rooms), and disputes […]
Representations, Reasons, and Actions
by Daniel A. Kaufman ___ More and more it seems to me that the way in which philosophy has gone the most wrong is in trying to assimilate human action with the motions of bodies, as understood in the natural sciences. This effort has made a mess of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of action, as well as ethics, […]
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