By Daniel A. Kaufman ___ The philosophical problem of consciousness is a problem concerning subjectivity. To be conscious is to be conscious of something: a color; a smell; a feeling or emotion; etc. This is why it is alternatively described as “conscious experience,” “self-consciousness,” etc. Consciousness, therefore, is a kind of point of view. Specifically, it is a first-person point […]
by Daniel A. Kaufman ___ Lately, I’ve been doing some work on Physicalism and social reality (1), suggesting that taking the latter seriously means that the former has to be false, and it seems to me that much of the reluctance people have expressed – and which pushes so many philosophers to insist on Physicalism – owes to certain uses […]
by Daniel A. Kaufman 1. You are talking with a friend who is, perhaps, a bit too taken with superhero comics. Halfway into an enthusiastic speech regarding the virtues of Captain America, you say to him gently, “You do realize that Captain America doesn’t exist, right?” What effect is this supposed to have on him? 2. Suppose your friend holds […]
by Daniel A. Kaufman Emotional prescription Does it make sense to speak of “prescribing” or “critically examining” an emotion or feeling? People often say things like this: “You should be happy.” “You should care about what happens to your sister.” “You shouldn’t be mad about that.” What do we ask of a person by way of expressions like these? Are […]
by Daniel A. Kaufman ‘Truth’ and ‘is true’ The most popular view on truth is some variation on the correspondence theory, according to which saying that a statement is true is saying that it “corresponds” to “reality” or “the facts” or “states of affairs” or some such thing. The trouble with this to my mind is at least threefold: (i) […]
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