Why I am Not a Rortyan but Would Like to Be

By Jay Jeffers

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There is no rivalry like an intrastate rivalry. In the state of Pragmatism, the game of the week is always Richard Rorty vs. Hilary Putnam. Nothing ever gets settled, but the effort is there. This is the third and likely final entry in an ongoing attempt to settle a few things. The first was a brief introduction to the disagreement, and the second was a deeper elaboration of the dispute. It is recommended that you read the first two pieces, at the very least the most recent, in order to track this presentation. If you’ve read the first two entries, you know that my sympathy is with Hilary Putnam. Still, I’d like to leave open the possibility of a productive solution.

My aim is to see what can be retained from Rorty, even while taking seriously Putnam’s concerns. It’s a synthesis I seek; a compromise. Unfortunately, for a synthesis, a thesis and antithesis have to be articulated first. I did most of this in the last two pieces, but some of the delineating work remains. A good synthesis takes the best from the thesis and antithesis and leaves the worst behind.

To recap, Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam represent two types of Pragmatism: Rorty’s went most decidedly against traditional philosophy, maintaining that the historic search for truth was over and we should get back to ordinary ways of thinking and speaking. Putnam, meanwhile, rejected the most ambitious forms of traditional philosophy but tried to save what he saw as most important from the tradition. Both are, in a manner of speaking, urging us to stop doing philosophy, either outright, or at least in a certain vein. Rorty provocatively asked, “What was Epistemology?” and on the reason for doing philosophy, Putnam quoted John Wisdom who advised that it’s to finish the journey “from the familiar to the familiar.”

When a person begins philosophy, they typically begin with a handle on their basic beliefs regarding the outside world, morality, and their own identity. They are oriented as a “normal” person would be. Then, at some point in the course of philosophical study, disorientation sets in. Puzzles about the most foundational beliefs give serious pause. One encounters proverbial fun house mirrors, fever swamps, ropes courses, and corn mazes. It’s also easy to get sidetracked along the way and end up studying something much more technical and niche than originally imagined, all just to get a handle on something taken for granted at the start: like referring to things with words, for example.

Rorty wants this to end, as it doesn’t contribute anything to the pressing matters of life. We should free ourselves of the pursuit of dead ends and put the skills and insights gained from philosophizing to better use in society at large. Everyone in the humanist conversation can at least agree that the philosophical impulse should be kept in perspective. David Hume said, “be a philosopher, but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.” Rorty goes so far as to aspire to a “post-philosophical” society. In this vision of the world, not only would the person suffering from philosophical overexposure be healed, but society, just as the Rortyan, would become “Ironist.”  

Rorty’s philosophical view glides seamlessly into his view on society and politics, which is liberal and rather conventionally so. Putnam accused Rorty of not completing the journey to the familiar, waiting on the other side of philosophy. After losing one’s footing in the course of philosophical study, Putnam believed that seasoned thinkers could find their way to the other side. The familiar that is waiting on the other side is surely more grizzled than it was in its original state, but it is familiar, nonetheless.

Putnam’s view, like Donald Davidson’s, is a “view from within,” and Rorty, despite openly gesturing toward such a view on many occasions, ultimately presents a “view from without,” from which we can experience the radical doubt of our own worldview. To Putnam, this flirts too closely with an anti-realism that mystifies more than it illuminates. It’s at least intelligible that if Rorty rejected the epistemologically optimistic view of traditional philosophy, then a certain kind of anti-realism would result. What’s not as immediately clear is how Putnam could do the same and still land on something relatively realist in comparison. Understanding how this happens will help show the route from navigating through the minefield of philosophy to the philosophical veteran’s version of everyday familiarity.

The philosopher of science, Ronald Giere, is a  “perspectivist,” and relies on color perception as a key example. We know that we both are perceiving something subjective when experiencing color, as well as something beyond our senses. We should reject the idea that because our natural color perception doesn’t capture an underlying essence of color wavelengths, that color isn’t “real.” The fact that a view is perspectival and likely incomplete doesn’t by itself make its contribution epistemically suspect.

Though we can’t know for sure that other people are perceiving color the same way that we are, color perception connects us to the world. Red is a specific light wavelength in the world, blue another, and so on. Even the subjective element has a consistency and staying power that would be too marginal to dismiss. Traffic lights keep civilization moving every day, for example. You can make it pretty far just from the view from within. What Putnam and thinkers like Davidson and Giere (and more recently, Michela Massimi) show us is that a kind of sturdy belief in workaday truth needn’t rely on a transcendent viewpoint.  

From the perspective from within, Putnam tells us that doubt requires as much justification as belief, and it is from this perceptive that a much more credible claim to the “ordinary” can be made, especially against Rorty’s hopes for a post-philosophical society.  It is not that Putnam wants an especially philosophical society, but rather that Rorty’s post philosophical vision would impose on the everyday to a significant degree. 

 The “ordinary” does not conjure up utopian ideals of a new world where post-metaphysical values reign.

Rorty knows that liberalism was born out of leaving religious passions and substantive disagreements over the good life aside, to whatever degree possible, in public spaces. He may see his vision of a post-philosophical society as fulfilling the promise of liberalism, but if it does, it’s by crossing its fingers behind its back. Religious and secular people alike have until now operated under the promise that their substantive view of ultimate truth and good would enjoy the legal protection of the private side of the public/private split. These kinds of substantive views would even be welcome as political reason-giving in public spaces, when the substantive reasons offered are consistent with the formal commitments of a liberal society. 

Many Rortyans, I fear, don’t believe Rorty was all that radical underneath – aside from his opposition to an overreaching and dehumanizing view of truth and rationality – so they have no qualms deeming the ordinary preferable to philosophy. And who could blame them, considering his casual, disarming air? If anyone had visited Rorty at home before his death in 2007, they could have encountered him, an avuncular figure and good neighbor, sitting in his living room, reading a book about birds (he was an avid bird watcher) and with A Prairie Home Companion playing on the kitchen radio. He would on occasion say that he had no interest in prohibiting truth-talk among the folk.

However, Rorty already defined truth as a mere pat on the back we give our beliefs. When he tells us “If you take care of freedom, truth takes care of itself,” there is no taking care of itself as an independently existing thing going alongside our discourse, as such a statement would suggest. Rorty’s casual temperament in interviews, his conventional political outlook, and his employment of terms like ‘truth’ in some contexts could all lead one to believe that his philosophical view is actually moderate at the end of the day. But this is a mistake. Rorty swatted away many moderate interventions in the context of philosophy proper, which should provide an interpretive guide to how he was speaking in looser contexts.

This touches on some degree of slippage between “radical” and “interesting.” Truly radical positions can be confused with more modest ones, as when Rorty comes across as more modest than he actually was. But there is an even greater slippage in Rorty’s Ironism, according to which an ironist is someone who is impressed with vocabularies radically different than his or her own. But if the difference in vocabularies were sufficiently radical in the relevant sense, there would be no possibility of being impressed. An encounter with a radically different vocabulary would be something we couldn’t characterize. A radically different vocabulary would seem like conceptual and epistemic gibberish, and this is setting aside incidental factors like phonetics.

A person with a more modest view of Rorty might feel exasperated at this stage, but Donald Davidson addressed this in his response to Quine’s “gavagai” argument. To Quine’s inscrutability of reference thesis, Davidson mentioned some typical examples of radical conceptual change, like the arrival of relativity theory in physics, and wrote “But examples like these, impressive as they occasionally are, are not so extreme but that the changes and the contrasts can be explained and described using the equipment of a single language.”

We should take Davidson at his word when he describes certain changes and differences as “impressive,” (what I call “interesting” above). Such differences can be quite striking, to the extent that it is rhetorically unfortunate to be put in the position of having to argue in favor of continual intellectual sameness, but it is Rorty’s radicalism that forces this stance. It is not that our knowledge necessarily cuts down to the essence of things or that there isn’t a limit to our knowledge beyond which we might later discover more or that our understanding can’t take on a significantly different light when articulated from another angle. Rather, it is simply pointless to entertain conceptual discontinuity past a certain margin of radical difference because it is unintelligible. Our field of experience contains many jarring twists and turns, but it is not radically fragmented from within, unless radical means “interesting but still quite intelligible,” in which case the viability of the doubt we are supposed to experience is itself called into question.

Putnam accused Rorty of being in thrall to a “Kantian picture.” Kant’s transcendental idealism posited a stark difference between our field of experience – the phenomenal – and reality as it is in itself – the noumenal. Kant, or at least Kant as we’ve come to know him, thought that we’re cut off from reality as it is in itself. But if this is true, the modest realism the pragmatist pursues would simply advise lopping the noumenal off from our conceptual picture. Some virtues would be put at risk with this move. For example, the humility and endurance to encourage continued evaluation of our beliefs and the pursuit of further exploration of even what we thought was empirically settled. But anything further we discover isn’t a proper example of crossing a radical limit beyond which the noumenal lies.

Take a common example in philosophy, the relationship between the word ‘water’ and the chemical substance H2O. H2O cannot be taken as radically beyond our previous conceptual scheme because we eventually encountered it and made sense of it. Admittedly to the layperson the encounter was experimental, clinical, and underlying the stuff we call water. But we encountered it all the same and it now holds a kind of intelligibility.

Of course, truth and rationality can be overdone. But so can anything. To be opposed to the excess isn’t to agree to a moratorium. Think of the body possessing an excess of insulin. To see this state of affairs as bad is not to favor the opposite. The idea is for the body to hold this hormone in balance, and of course for all the other elements in the body to run their normal course.

What I’ve sketched from Putnam, Giere, and Davidson constitutes something closer to the ordinary than Rorty’s imagined post-philosophical society. But it has its drawbacks. As I mentioned in the last piece, Putnam’s view can be stifling itself, as it only looks from within, while the fullness of human experience includes at least imagining a subject-transcendent view. Rorty’s great rhetorical achievement was to induce an experience of raw noumena without requiring a deep epistemic commitment on the part of the reader. Rorty provides spaciousness and even believed in unconceptualized, “causal impingement” from the world taking place independently of our worldviews, which admittedly tells us very little without the framing effects of our vocabularies, but still maintains contact with “the world outside.”

Previously, I wrote that Rorty “… paints a vague picture of a vista on the cliff’s edge of our vocabulary, from which we can see radical nothingness, but as in the implicature of Buddhism, is actually functioning as some sort of wonderful something.” In spite of the thinly veiled mockery in that sentence, I must admit that I want in on this experience. I want a whiff of that mountain air. It might just be the aesthetic allure, I don’t know. But, I want a view that is above all, humanistic. I conjure what I can only imagine are the experiences of those in pre-history, looking over the horizon, over the plains, hearing distant yelps from animals in the distance, seeing lightning storms develop, experiencing the first excitations for the myth making of their communities, and I ask myself what could be out there. It could be anything! My daydream ceases when I remember that I lack the vocabulary to convert it into a concrete thought of anything in particular, but the juices are flowing even as the feeling of radical doubt sets in.

I see no real harm in partaking in this cleansing meditation and becoming a post-philosophical person. I also don’t see the harm in taking one’s first steps into the ordinary with this mindset. However, whether one’s material or political goals for society are conventional or radical, when it comes to philosophy even in a Rortyan vein, the post-philosophical person should simply let society be, and in the course of living, eventually allow herself to be submerged into ordinary life as just one more common person among people. If supplementary help for the individual is needed from philosophy proper, then let a Hilary Putnam or a Donald Davidson show the way to the familiar. Otherwise, the post-philosophical person should exercise great caution before consulting philosophers for help with any existential disturbance in ordinary life. The ordinary can’t be reduced to a pre or post or even a contemporary philosophical mood. It’s an untamed and variegated convergence of contexts and influences that requires a certain kind of rhythm and durability. It is neither particularly philosophical nor post-philosophical. Starting from the rarefied space of philosophy, and looking out onto ordinary life, the idea is to hold these parts of the self in some kind of balance that does as little violence as possible to the others through gratuitous compartmentalization.

I can only gesture at this how this might come together in one view. Perhaps it starts with cheeky turns of phrase like Professor Richard Putnam; a practitioner of a Davidsonian Ironism; Rorty in the streets, Putnam in the sheets. When we exist solely in the view from without, we lose our sense of responsibility, and our muscles atrophy. When we exist solely in the view from within, we are cut off from living. We need a view that preserves the fullness of humanity, which includes both feeling and thought, playfulness and sensibility, and ultimately, familiarity.

Comments

5 responses to “Why I am Not a Rortyan but Would Like to Be”

  1. jofrclark

    Such an interesting subject!

    “When we exist solely in the view from without, we lose our sense of responsibility, and our muscles atrophy. When we exist solely in the view from within, we are cut off from living. We need a view that preserves the fullness of humanity, which includes both feeling and thought, playfulness and sensibility, and ultimately, familiarity.”

    Spoken like a true pragmatist. The pragmatists problem has always been marrying the world without with the world within in viewing human existence. Rorty’s dim view of philosophy stems from traditional philosophy’s metacognitive excesses in the form of the world within’s mental abstraction from the world without.

    I would submit the currently offered pragmatist’s solution attempts to enshrine the essential pragmatist insight that the world without-world within dichotomy is not solved in terms of the traditional objective- subjective dichotomy but rather with an abstract-relative dichotomy in which we transcend abstraction to incorporate both the objective-subjective together as a unified relative whole that views existence, both without and within, as a unified relative whole.

    Epistemology and truth thus become a function of this relative whole not in terms of truth being an internal state of mind within but one of dynamic relation state incorporating both internal and external state in terms of health and functionality. This will force consideration of what the function of the human mind is – an essentially pragmatic consideration.

    In such a formulation, we must begin to talk not of static epistemic knowledge within but of epistemic cycles in which objects/circumstances in the world without are perceived through our phenomenon (senses) and then processed in our world within with noumenon which lead to actions in the real world that we then perceive and which in turn lead to further epistemic cycles – and on and on. Through this ongoing epistemic cycling, we refine our understanding and pragmatic functionality in the world.

    Thus the phenomenon and noumenon formulation becomes incomplete. Something else is needed – essmenon (from the Latin esse “to be”). Essemenon are the thing-in-itself in the world without that we “see” and represent in our mind within with phenomena and then process within with our internal noumena which then changes our mind and leads to choice and action in the world without that then goes on to change that world without – and on and on.

    As the essay implies, in this relative essemenon-phenomenon-noumenon- essemenon cycling formulation of epistemology, we will have to leave off the pure objectivity and rationality of our intellectual thoughts as the only arbiters of truth and incorporate the relativity and intuition of our emotional feelings.

    “Of course, truth and rationality can be overdone.”

    What is being overdone here is the equating of our rationality with truth finding. Truth finding will need to incorporate our relational emotionality along with our objective rationality in a more wholistic formulation of our minds and thus epistemology and truth. We must see the liberal “leaving religious passions and substantive (ethical) disagreements over the good life aside” as something that has been overdone in Western culture/philosophy in favor of a (non-pragmatic) nihilism. To be pragmatic inherently means being emotional about things and developing a robust affective epistemology to come alongside Western philosophy’s inherently hyper-intellectualized traditional philosophy in order to come to a more thorough understanding of our world, ourselves, and truth.

  2. “It’s a synthesis I seek…”: Rorty, ironically, says

    Hegel’s so-called dialectical method is not an argumentative procedure or a way of unifying subject and object, but simply a literary skill – skill at producing surprising gestalt switches by making smooth, rapid transitions from one terminology to another.

  3. Thanks for the thought provoking essay. Allow me to push back a bit on your characterization of Rorty’s post-philosophical society.

    ‘Rorty wants this to end, as it doesn’t contribute anything to the pressing matters of life. We should free ourselves of the pursuit of dead ends and put the skills and insights gained from philosophizing to better use in society at large…Rorty goes so far as to aspire to a “post-philosophical” society. In this vision of the world, not only would the person suffering from philosophical overexposure be healed, but society, just as the Rortyan, would become “Ironist.”’

    I think this is a common, but unfair, reading of Rorty. His utopian society would ‘would give the resources and the leisure to do their individualistic thing’ to all sorts of people, including ‘Kantian strivers as well as self-involved aesthetes, people who cannot live without religion and people who despise it, nature’s metaphysicians as well as nature’s pragmatists.’ So, not only would Rorty’s utopia not eliminate philosophy, metaphysics, religion, etc., it would actually provide resources and leisure time to pursue them!

    But only if they are pursued privately. Although you allude to his public/private distinction in your essay, you don’t really apply it to Rorty’s utopian vision. He did not wish to put an end to private versions of philosophy, metaphysics, religion, etc. Private does not mean personal, as in keep it to yourself and don’t do it in a group; it means don’t do it as part of political decision-making. Publicly, they must put aside such beliefs in maintaining public practices and institutions of liberal cooperation: ‘If people who heartily disagree about such issues can agree to cooperate in the functioning of the practices and institutions that have, in Wilde’s words, “substituted cooperation for competition,” that will suffice…For we humans need not agree about the nature or the end of man in order to help facilitate our neighbor’s ability to act on her own convictions on these matters, just so long as those actions do not interfere with our freedom to act on our own convictions.’

    In such a liberal utopia, no particular group’s belief system will dominate because there will be no dominant form of culture: ‘the literary culture will not be the only, or even the dominant, form of high culture. That is because there will be no dominant form.’ Such forms of private culture ‘will be viewed as matters of taste;’ ‘[t]hey will be viewed by nonintellectuals in the same relaxed, tolerant, and uncomprehending way that we presently regard our neighbor’s obsession with bird watching, or collecting hubcaps, or discovering the secrets of the great pyramids.’

    Given Rorty’s post-philosophical vision of philosophical and religious intellectuals being viewed as hobbyists by ordinary (nonintellectual) people, I don’t see how you can claim that ‘Rorty’s post philosophical vision would impose on the everyday to a significant degree.’

    Rorty would completely agree that ‘the post-philosophical person should simply let society be’, i.e., not bring their private ‘hobby’ beliefs into political decision-making. But he would reject the demand or suggestion that groups with private inspirational belief systems (be they religious or philosophical) ‘eventually allow [themselves] to be submerged into ordinary life as just one more common person among people.’ The unordinary have just as much right the their unordinary private tastes as the ordinary have in their ordinary private one. The only sphere in which we should submerge into the ‘ordinary’ is in the public, political sphere. Such a society is post-philosophical, post-metaphysical, post-religious, etc. only in the public, political sphere.

  4. Jay Jeffers

    Thank you for your comment.

    From Rorty, responding to the question “What is a ‘post-metaphysical’ culture?”

    “A poeticized, or post-metaphysical, culture, is one in which the imperative that is common to religion and metaphysics – to find an ahistorical, transcultural matrix for one’s thinking, something into which everything can fit, independent of one’s time and place – has dried up and blown away. It would be a culture of human beings as creating their own life-world, rather than as being responsible to God or ‘the nature of reality,’ which tells them what kind it is.”

    I think the natural way to understand this reading is to apply to society at large, not only the formal rules of the public space (bc that’s just Rawls), but how people see themselves as entering into it.

    The only way for me to understand your reading (of this quote, for example) is to see Rorty as recommending a highly compartmentalized version of human beings as they move back and forth between the public and private spaces. At the very least, this isn’t my understanding of the public space at all. It’s definitely true that there’s much too much metaphysics in the public realm for my taste (in the form of Fundamentalist Christianity), but the current form of ordinary political speech as I understand it is that a liberal Methodist could use all their literal God-reasoning to reach the same ends as me, a godless heathen. And neither of us seem to mind.

    There is no call in the ordinary space as it’s currently construed to leave God or ultimate explanation **completely** aside. Only to try to vibe with one another in the liberal space no matter how we imagine our way into it.

    I agree that my reading of Rorty on this is common and I don’t doubt that there are some places where he might have put less of a fine point on it, but the quote above seems like a good guide.

    https://cedires.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Rorty_interview_1995.pdf

  5. Jay Jeffers

    That’s a wonderful quote, David.

    It’s my understanding, in fact, that Hegel himself didn’t even characterize his thinking in this way, at least not explicitly. I suppose I was employing the more mechanical common use (to whatever extent philosophy-talk can ever be “common”).